# Aff Round Report UMich Vs. Iowa City West BT Rd. 2

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#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 is Dodd-Frank

#### Now is crunch time to pass the agreement – no da’s

**Fox News, 3/10 –** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” <http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)//SDL>

¶ Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments.¶ SUMMARY¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.”¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year.¶ For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment.¶ “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.”¶ Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing.¶ If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty.¶ If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

#### Our aff is inherent and avoids the link to politics

**Boman, 13 –** (Karen Boman, Associated Press Staff Writer for RigZone. October 14, 2013. “Senate Passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact,” http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\_gas/a/129582/Senate\_Passes\_USMexico\_Drilling\_Pact)//SDL

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Saturday that would implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The Senate passed the bill by “unanimous consent”, avoiding a roll call vote, The Hill reported on Sunday. Last year, government officials from the two countries signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which would establish rules for developing oil and gas resources along the United States’ maritime border with Mexico. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act (H.R. 1613), which would enact the terms of the agreement signed by the Obama administration and Mexico to govern how to explore, develop, and share revenue from all oil and gas resources along the Gulf of Mexico’s maritime border. H.R. 1613 would lift the current moratorium on exploration and production along the Western Gap section of the boundary, opening up 1.5 million acres in the Gulf previously off limits due to border issues, and provide a framework for the safe management of oil and gas resources in the boundary area. While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported.

**Dodd Frank is key to transparency rules in the oil industry – EU modeling proves - exemption in the TBHA would undermine the US model**

**Gary, 13 –** (Ian Gary, Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America. May 9, 2013. “A back door attack on oil payment transparency,” http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attack-on-oil-payment-transparency/)//SDL

Oxfam has no problem with the approval of the US-Mexico TBA which simply lays out the rules for how hydrocarbons reserves in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle our maritime borders would be developed.¶ We do have a big problem with an irrelevant provision inserted into the bill designed to weaken the payment disclosure requirements in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Cardin-Lugar provision. That law provides for the annual disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to host governments around the world – final rules were issued by the SEC in August last year. H.R. 1613 would exempt any covered company from reporting payments from in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere in the world.¶ The American Petroleum Institute (API) – backed by companies such as Exxon, Shell, Chevron and BP – is suing the SEC in federal court and is now hoping that its Congressional allies can help weaken this landmark law. Oxfam is intervening to defend the rule. Meanwhile, the European Union has reached agreement to put in place similar reporting requirements.¶ I spoke this week with Neil Brown who was, until very recently, a top Senate Republican aide working on energy issues for Senator Lugar, who was the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His response: “this exemption is unnecessary and inclusion would only forestall quick approval of this important agreement.”¶ He should know. As both the co-author of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report for Senator Lugar on “Oil, Mexico and the Transboundary Agreement” as well as someone intimately familiar with the “Cardin-Lugar” provision in Dodd-Frank, Mr. Brown would know if the reporting requirements in Dodd-Frank Section 1504 present any issue in approving the US-Mexico TBA. The short answer – they don’t. The minority staff report envisions reporting under Section 1504 and says that under Section 1504 covered companies “would already have to disclose payments” to the SEC if “they invest in Mexico”.¶ The US-Mexico TBA requires that certain information be kept confidential unless disclosure is required by law. The TBA text demonstrates that the US and Mexico have already made the correct policy judgment that the specific confidentiality provisions of the TBA should be subordinated to each country’s commitment to openness and subject to each country’s disclosure requirements. Nothing in the TBA would require the exemption provided by H.R. 1613.¶ Tellingly, the Senate Energy Committee has introduced a bi-partisan bill, S. 812, sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) to approve the US-Mexico TBA, and it contains no Section 1504 exemption provision. If Congress is truly interested in approving this agreement and providing the “rules of the road” for joint development of oil and gas reserves straddling the US-Mexico maritime boundary, then it should adopt the clean Senate bill without the reporting exemption.¶ Former Senator Jeff Bingaman, past Senate Energy Committee chairman, told Reuters that the exemption proposed by the House “complicates things significantly” for passage of the bill. Referring to the Section 1504 exemption language, he said, “They’ve added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that form.”¶ The Mexican Congress ratified the TBA a year ago, and the Obama administration – and the oil industry – would like to see it approved. The Obama administration, though, has made clear that implementation of Section 1504 is a priority.¶ In a letter to Oxfam, Sec. of State Kerry said, “The Department of State and Administration strongly support transparency in the extractives sectors, as outlined in Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, and the new rule issued by the SEC. The new SEC standard directly advances our foreign policy interest in increasing transparency and reducing corruption, particularly in the oil, gas and mineral sectors.”

#### Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

**Clough, 10 -** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

¶ Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population.¶ ¶ Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.¶ ¶ Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

#### Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

**Morgan, 7** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

**Specifically, Indo-Pak war goes nuclear**

**Caldicott 2** (Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, p. xiii)

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

**Dodd Frank is key to transparency to set a global norm against corruption in Africa**

**Geman, 13** – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. April 26, 2013. “Senate bill on US-Mexico drilling lacks Dodd-Frank exemption” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296451-senate-bill-on-us-mexico-drilling-lacks-dodd-frank-exemption-)//SDL

“API is hopeful that Congress and the administration will address the problematic 1504 rules, and we certainly would like to see these important 1504 exemptions make it through to a final bill so that U.S. companies can compete on a level playing field,” he said, referring to the numerical section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law that required the disclosure rule.¶ But backers of the SEC requirement oppose the exemption in the House bill and are concerned the bill is part of a wider effort to repeal the SEC rule.¶ The rule will require SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth.¶ It is aimed at undoing the “resource curse,” in which some impoverished countries in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by corruption and conflict alongside their energy and mineral wealth.

#### Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure – our evidence is Africa Specific Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)//SDL

¶ “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.”¶ ¶ The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty.¶ ¶ A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China.¶ ¶ In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures.¶ ¶ “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC.¶ ¶ But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year.¶ ¶ “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

Corruption over energy is the key internal link to stability – must avoid the resource curse

Conway ‘12

J. Edward Conway, doctoral candidate and postgraduate researcher at the Institute for Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies at the University of St Andrews and independent political risk consultant for mining companies in Central Asia 12 [“How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137306/j-edward-conway/how-afghanistan-can-escape-the-resource-curse]

Until just a few weeks ago, serious talk about an Afghan economy based on natural resources seemed premature. But as Kabul inks more mining deals with international investors -- it awarded two major tenders at the end of 2011 -- and as NATO continues its drawdown of international troops, natural resources are shaping up to serve as the cornerstone of sustainable development there. This raises an unavoidable and possibly tragic question: Considering the country's lack of infrastructure and its rampant corruption, will Afghanistan become yet another data point in the literature on underdeveloped countries that fall victim to the resource curse?¶ The possibility is real. Officials in both Washington and Kabul claim that the country's mineral wealth is worth as much as $3 trillion. Experts have suspected Afghanistan's resource potential for decades, and U.S. Geological Survey fieldwork conducted between 2009 and 2011 confirmed the existence of significant copper, iron ore, gold, lithium, rare earths, and mineral fuel resources such as coal, oil, and gas, and possibly even uranium.¶ But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. ¶ Mining corporations and the Afghan government have wasted no time. In late 2011, Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines signed an oil exploration and production deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation to develop the Amu Darya basin's 80 million barrels of estimated crude reserves over the next 25 years; production is expected to begin this year. At the moment, the ministry is finalizing details with an Indian consortium of mining companies to develop the Hajigak deposit, one of the largest undeveloped iron ore deposits in the world, which has the potential to produce steel for the next 40 years. Both of these deals come after Kabul signed over to the Chinese the rights to the Aynak copper deposit in 2008, and the Qara Zaghan gold deposit to a consortium of investors gathered together by J. P. Morgan in early 2011. Taken together, these first forays into Afghanistan's newfound subterranean treasure chest will mean billions of dollars in investment over the next decade; there will be new rail infrastructure, power plants, and possibly even a refinery. Kabul will reap significant new tax revenues, and tens of thousands of Afghans will be put to work.¶ Unconditional celebration, however, would be premature. Agreements notwithstanding, not a single mine has produced anything tangible -- not even the almost four-year-old Aynak copper mine, which will allegedly begin operation next year. Chinese investors also appear to be sliding on their promise to build a railroad as a part of the Aynak deal. Because of likely high operating costs, it remains unclear when the J. P. Morgan consortium will be able to produce an ounce of gold that competes at market prices.¶ What's more, estimates for trillion-dollar earnings are almost entirely based on resources, not reserves -- a technical but critical difference. Reserve estimates incorporate economic, legal, social, governmental, and environmental risks to determine what is actually profitable to develop, as well as the site-specific mining and metallurgical challenges. Resource estimates result in optimistic press releases; reserve estimates result in foreign investment, jobs, and budgetary contributions. Kabul and Washington have focused on signing deals, thinking that a few key agreements would soothe the concerns of risk-averse investors. But the real challenge for the industry will be in production. And the test for Afghanistan -- herein lies the possibility of a curse -- will be whether or not a majority of the country reaps the secondary benefits of the mining sector's development.¶ Resource curse theories follow two tracks. On the first, the overwhelming revenue drawn from the sector exacerbates corruption within the government. That scenario is hardly difficult to imagine in Afghanistan, as the country is currently considered the second most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. On the second track, increased mineral exports strengthen a country's currency and consequently crowd out other sectors (such as agriculture) from being competitive on the world market. This is a threat in Afghanistan, clearly, as its economy is largely dependent on farming. ¶ But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Many states in the region are blessed with mineral wealth but cursed by infrastructure obstacles and social instability; accordingly, they have faced challenges in attracting foreign investors, cultivating resources without losing profits to graft, and avoiding introducing new divisions among the population. The most important lesson for Afghanistan to learn is that it will have to build a resource-based economy with the support of local Afghans. ¶ Take Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous, landlocked country with little rail infrastructure, deteriorating roads, and an economy based on foreign aid, remittances, and mining. Until recently, successive authoritarian leaders since the mid-1990s, such as Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, advised foreign mining companies to avoid getting involved locally; a few token social projects to placate the people living near a project would suffice. But keeping out of local affairs has backfired. Mining revenues were funneled to elites in the capital, and a negligible percentage went to the local community for development and infrastructure projects.¶ Over time, local miners moved their families (and wealth) to the capital city; the loss of revenue and investment left the mining towns without running water or a functioning sewage system. In Barskaun, the only paved road is the one that leads to the mine -- Kumtor, a single gold mine, which represents ten percent of the country's GDP. That neglect not only shortchanged the locals but breeds insecurity today. In Aral, where there is a foreign-operated gold mine, armed men on horseback caused a million dollars' worth of damage in October 2011, forcing the site to remain closed until a settlement was reached with villagers three months later.¶ But then consider Kazakhstan, where the opposite has happened. The country of 16 million is an oil and gas exporter but also a global leader in copper, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium reserves and production. Since its independence in the 1990s, both foreign investors and government officials have focused on socioeconomic development in the areas surrounding key mining sites; today mines serve as a catalyst for province-wide growth. Managers and workers live locally, spend locally, and educate their children locally.¶ Astana has imposed strict requirements on foreign miners -- forcing them to sign annual memorandums of cooperation with local governors, under which both parties together determine the social investment projects to be funded by the firm in the province for that year. The strategy dates back to the Soviet era, when most of these mining operations had their hand in all aspects of the local community. Today this is reflected in foreign mining companies funding schools, gyms, sports stadiums, daycare centers, and orphanages and foster care networks, as well as providing electric-power capacity to homes and businesses across the country. Not coincidently, Kazakhstan ranks far ahead of all other Central Asian states on country risk indices for foreign investors.¶ Unfortunately, at the moment Afghanistan is looking more like the former than the latter. Politically the country is already overly centralized in Kabul, and with Aynak and Hajigak within driving distance, it's not difficult to envision a future where the benefits of the extractive sector remain in the capital. Further, while all foreign developers are required to invest in development projects, it remains to be seen if these firms will make good on their promises and if local leaders will be empowered in the subsequent decision-making process. Whereas Kazakhstan enforces strict production and investment quotas -- if you don't produce and invest as you promised, you're out -- citing force majeure in Afghanistan (from war to civil disturbances to labor issues) seems like an easy way for Aynak and Hajigak to renege on local commitments, potentially aggravating the existing socioeconomic gap between Kabul and the rest of the country.¶ It all comes back to ensuring a positive correlation between increased foreign investment and improved quality of life. In Kyrgyzstan you have armed men on horseback; in Kazakhstan you have local athletes wearing jerseys sporting the foreign miner's logo. There's no question that there are significant differences between the situation in Afghanistan and those in the Central Asian states. Afghanistan's levels of corruption and violence are far higher, the education level is much lower, and on transport infrastructure and power capacity issues, it is starting from scratch. But just as Kabul's mining deals to date are little more than agreements on paper, the unsettled nature of the larger issues can provide an opportunity to forge a path ahead. If Afghanistan wants to achieve that positive correlation of foreign investment with local quality of life -- and in doing so open the gates to foreign investment from the more risk-averse -- the Kabul-based elites and their foreign miners will need to spread the wealth.

**Corruption in Africa causes wars, genocide and humanitarian disasters – only transparent democracies can solve**

**Diamond, 98**  (Larry Diamond, Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. January 1998. “Restoring Democracy in Africa,” http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20301225/restoring-democracy-in-africa )//SDL

¶ The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite.¶ ¶ In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no trust, institutions to facilitate cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups.¶ ¶ The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.¶ ¶ Given Africa's authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realizes that every type of dictatorship on the continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the predictability of a democratic constitution.¶ ¶ As Hoover Institution senior fellow Barry Weingast pointed out in the American Political Science Review, contending that ethnic groups will not trust and tolerate one another and cooperate for a larger national good unless there are credible limits on the state. Democracy can not be stable unless rulers see that it is in their interest to abide by the rules. What makes it in their interest is the overriding commitment of all major ethnic groups, parties, and interest organizations to a constitution.

**African instability goes nuclear.**

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

## Contention 2 Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### Three Internal Links:

#### The first internal link is oil dependence:

#### THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

#### Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

#### Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

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Third Internal Link is Dodd-Frank:

**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 3 is Drilling

#### Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

#### Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

#### Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

#### Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

#### Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

## Case

## Dodd Frank

## Heg

No chance of transition – policy makers will cling to the unipolar dream and other nations won’t fill the vacuum – more ev

Shalmon and Horowitz 9 (Profs of IR Dan and Mike , Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

## Oil DA

No correlation between drilling and world market prices – 20 renowned economists cited—star this card!

Fong 12(Jocelyn Fong, writer for the MediaMatters For America Blog. March 22, 2013. “20 Experts Who Say Drilling Won't Lower Gas Prices,” http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/22/20-experts-who-say-drilling-wont-lower-gas-pric/184040)

In a pretty impressive act of journalism, the Associated Press recently conducted a "statistical analysis of 36 years of monthly, inflation-adjusted gasoline prices and U.S. domestic oil production." The result: "No statistical correlation between how much oil comes out of U.S. wells and the price at the pump." It's neat to see math cut through the talking points and get straight to the truth of the matter -- which is that expanding drilling is a fundamentally ineffectual response to gas price spikes. Given that changes in U.S. oil production don't move gasoline prices, it should be clear that U.S. government policies related to drilling are of even smaller consequence. Indeed, 92 percent of economists surveyed by the Chicago Booth School of Business agreed this week that "changes in U.S. gasoline prices over the past 10 years have predominantly been due to market factors rather than U.S. federal economic or energy policies. Still not convinced? How about another 20 economists and analysts from across the political spectrum who will tell you the same thing: Ken Green, American Enterprise Institute, "If the U.S. produced more of its own oil, it would probably reduce imports, but it's not likely that it would reduce prices ... We probably cannot produce so much oil to exert downward pressure on prices compared to the world market." Peter Van Doren and Jerry Taylor, Cato Institute: "Sure, more domestic oil creates the possibility of fewer refined imports tied to the price of Brent crude, but given that the price of Brent sets the price for crude generally, the result would be more profit for domestic crude producers rather than significantly lower gasoline prices for Americans (not that there's anything wrong with that)."¶ Doug Holtz-Eakin, American Action Forum: "Domestic action to increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market." Christopher Knittel, MIT economist: "There are not many markets where the United States can't impose its will on market outcomes ... This is one we can't, and it's hard for the average American to understand that and it's easy for politicians to feed off that."¶ Pinelopi Goldberg, Yale economist: "US domestic policy has only tiny effect on the world price of oil. US foreign policy is probably more relevant than energy policy." Steve Koonin, Institute for Defense Analyses: "When you hear the international oil companies advocating for energy independence, it's really about making money, which isn't a bad thing ... If they produce a million more barrels a day, they're not going to change the global price much. And since they know the global price is going up, they'll just make more money. There's nothing wrong with that, but it doesn't solve the price problem or the greenhouse gas problem."¶ Michael Levi, Council on Foreign Relations: "The amount of oil you produce at home doesn't affect the price ... You can lower your vulnerability to price by lowering your consumption of oil, but not by increasing your production." Severin Borenstein, UC Berkeley economist: "Producing more oil domestically will enrich the U.S. economy, particularly U.S. oil companies and their workers. With oil so valuable, it may be a good idea, though the value must be weighed against environmental consequences. But it will have no discernible impact on gas prices, because it will change the world's supply/demand balance for oil by less than 2 or 3 percent over a decade or more." David Peterson, Duke statistician: "U.S. production and demand have little to do with the price of gasoline in the U.S."¶ Edward Melnick, NYU statistician: When U.S. production goes up, the price of gas "is certainly not going down ... The data does not suggest that whatsoever." David Sandalow, former Brookings fellow: "Drilling offshore to lower oil prices is like walking an extra 20 feet per day to lose weight. ... It's just not going to make much of a difference."¶ Tom Kloza, Oil Price Information Service: "This drill drill drill thing is tired ... It's a simplistic way of looking for a solution that doesn't exist." Richard Newell, former Administrator of Energy Information Administration: "We do not project additional volumes of oil that could flow from greater access to oil resources on Federal lands to have a large impact on prices given the globally integrated nature of the world oil market." Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research: "There is almost no disagreement among economists that drilling everywhere all the time offshore will have almost no impact on the price of gas in the United States. The reason is that we have a world market for oil. The additional oil that might come from offshore drilling is a drop in the bucket in a world oil market of almost 90 million barrels a day." Lou Crandall, Wrightson ICAP LLC: "Higher oil prices today are a global phenomenon, and the additional supply from increased drilling by the U.S. would not alter the global balance of supply and demand greatly. Gasoline prices at the pump would be higher either way. The only difference is that a somewhat larger share of the revenue would accrue to domestic interests (governmental and private) rather than to foreign suppliers."¶ Paul Bledsoe, Bipartisan Policy Center: "The notion that somehow we can produce so much domestically that we will move the global price is incorrect." Tom O'Donnell, The New School: "The amount of extra oil that the U.S. would produce, as far as affecting the world price of oil, is almost insignificant."' Deborah Gordon, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "We can drill doggedly in our own backyards, but the price of gasoline will remain more a matter of speculation over externally-driven factors than tapping new sources of oil at home." Joseph Dukert, energy analyst: "Americans tend to exaggerate the price effects of fluctuations in domestic production in relation to the total amount of oil in global trade. On the larger stage, the perception of geopolitical risks is more important." Phyllis Martin, Energy Information Administration: "In 2009, the U.S. produced about 7 percent of what was produced in the entire world, so increasing the oil production in the U.S. is not going to make much of a difference in world markets and world prices ... It just gets lost. It's not that much." Even Fox's John Stossel acknowledged recently that U.S. energy policy "doesn't make that much of a difference" on gas prices, contrary to what others at Fox News are claiming.

No impact to Russia Economic collapse

Goodrich and Zeihan 9 (Lauren Goodrich, Stratfor's Director of Analysis and Senior Eurasia analyst, and Peter Zeihan, Vice President of Analysis at Stratfor, “The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength,” March 3 2009, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090302_financial_crisis_and_six_pillars_russian_strength>)

Politics: It is no secret that the Kremlin uses an iron fist to maintain domestic control. There are few domestic forces the government cannot control or balance. The Kremlin understands the revolutions (1917 in particular) and collapses (1991 in particular) of the past, and it has control mechanisms in place to prevent a repeat. This control is seen in every aspect of Russian life, from one main political party ruling the country to the lack of diversified media, limits on public demonstrations and the infiltration of the security services into nearly every aspect of the Russian system. This domination was fortified under Stalin and has been re-established under the reign of former President and now-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This political strength is based on neither financial nor economic foundations. Instead, it is based within the political institutions and parties, on the lack of a meaningful opposition, and with the backing of the military and security services. Russia's neighbors, especially in Europe, cannot count on the same political strength because their systems are simply not set up the same way.

No Russian economic collapse—emergency funds

Simpson 12 (John Simpson, writer for Bloomberg news source, “Russia Earmarks Up to $40 Billion to Shore Up Economy, FT Says”, 6/18/12, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-18/russia-earmarks-up-to-40-billion-to-shore-up-economy-ft-says.html>, zs)

Russia has earmarked as much as $40 billion for this year and next to bolster its economy in the event the euro-region crisis widens and spreads and is also renewing a plan to permit the government to recapitalize the nation’s banking system, the Financial Times reported, citing an interview with Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. Siluanov said the government is planning to create a reserve mechanism worth 500 billion rubles ($15.4 billion) for 2013 to provide for financing “anti-crisis measures,” the newspaper said. The FT cited the minister as saying that the amount would include support for people who are “socially needy” and the recreation of a 2009 program that was not implemented at that time by which government bonds would be issued to recapitalize banks in exchange for shares. Siluanov was speaking ahead of the G-20 meeting in Mexico, the FT said.

Oil isn’t key to Russia’s economy

Rapoza 11 (Kenneth Rapoza, staff writer for Forbes, “Nomura Cuts Russia Growth Forecast”, 8/11/11, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/08/11/nomura-cuts-russia-growth-forecast/>, zs)

“What we find interesting about the Q2 GDP growth estimate is that growth decelerated during the quarter when the average price of Brent was $117 a barrel, the highest since the beginning of the crisis.,” says Orlova. “This confirms that Russian growth has decoupled from oil prices – mainly because its extracting sector output is constrained by the lack of investment in production facilities in the preceding years. There seems to be no immediate pass-through from the higher oil price into the domestic confidence indices and output and demand indicators. However, although the economy is no longer benefitting from positive oil price shocks, it is not immune from negative oil price shocks which we think are likely to trigger capital flight and higher borrowing costs for Russian companies and the state. With a more flexible rouble, lower oil prices also translate into a weaker currency and that dents consumer confidence,” she says.

No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

## Alaska CP

Unconditional engagement key to solve artic conflict

Goldwyn 8/14 (2013 David L. Goldwyn, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution Neil R. Brown and Cory R. Gill, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill)

Finally, the exemption also overreaches in shaping the nature of not only the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary agreement, but also any future transboundary agreement. Should hydrocarbons development continue in the Arctic, future transboundary agreements with Russia or Canada may be required. Would it be in U.S. interests to facilitate revenue secrecy in Moscow? Given that the EU recently passed its own transparency measures similar to Section 1504 while Canada and Switzerland are considering similar laws, international norms regarding extractive industry transparency may be significantly different by the time agreements with Russia and Canada are negotiated.

Arctic conflict cause miscalculation and accidental nuclear war

Huebert 07(Rob, Associate Professor of Political Science & the Strategic Studies Program @ the University of Calgary, Appendix 4, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 – “Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security.” <http://www.carc.org/calgary/a4.htm>)

The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but mis-communications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever. In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

Ice forms the size of Manhattan make this land unworkable—and this is an independent environment DA to the counterplan

Gosden 12 (Emily Gosden, Head writer for the Telegraph, “Overcoming challenges of Arctic oil drilling”, 9/3/12, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/9577117/Overcoming-challenges-of-Arctic-oil-drilling.html>, zs)

Drilling for oil and gas has always been a risky business. The world’s precious hydrocarbon resources are rarely found in convenient locations; overcoming technical, political and environmental challenges is part of the job. But last week Christophe de Margerie, chief executive of French oil giant Total, broke ranks. When it came to the Arctic Ocean, he declared, the risk of a spill was simply too high. While many of his peers clearly disagree with his assessment that drilling for oil should not proceed, few would dispute the unique risks of the fragile region. For the environment and the companies involved, a spill in the Arctic could be catastrophic. In the Alaskan Arctic, where Royal Dutch Shell began drilling offshore last month, temperatures drop to minus 20 degrees celsius in summer. Gale force winds move giant ice floes – Shell’s drilling rig has already had to get out of the way of one block bigger than Manhattan. And in winter, when daylight lasts barely a few hours, sea ice forms, makes the region inaccessible. “The drilling conditions facing oil companies operating in the Arctic are some of the most challenging on Earth,” Greenpeace argues. “The hostile weather, freezing conditions and remote location present unprecedented challenges for dealing with a spill.”

## Neolib K

Neoliberalism inevitable and sustainable

Hudson 99 [Mark, Progressive Librarian, Fall, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller”]

Neoliberal ideas are as old as capitalism itself, but in recent decades they have seen a tremendous resurgence and have displaced the state-interventionist economic theories of the interwar and post-World War II periods to become the reigning ideology of our time. Neoliberalism emerged full force in the 1980s with the right-wing Reagan and Thatcher regimes, but its influence has since spread across the political spectrum to encompass not only centrist political parties but even much of the traditional social-democratic left. In the 1990s, neoliberal hegemony over our politics and culture has become so overwhelming that it is becoming difficult to even rationally discuss what neoliberalism is; indeed, as Robert McChesney notes, the term "neoliberalism" is hardly known to the U.S. public outside of academia and the business community (McChesney). The corporate stranglehold on our information and communications media gives neoliberal ideologues a virtually unchallenged platform from which to blast their pro-market messages into every corner of our common culture. At the same time, neoliberalism provides the ideological cover for deregulatory legislation (most recently the 1996 Telecommunications Act) that enables corporations to extend their monopoly over these media even more. For the past three decades, one of the fiercest and most coherent critics of corporate control over the information/communications sphere has been the social scientist Herbert Schiller. Although Schiller began his career before neoliberalism's ascendance, and he does not even today use the term in his writings, his work provides essential insights into the roots of neoliberal/corporate hegemony over our information media and the adverse consequences of that hegemony for our politics, economy and culture.

Transition will fail and create chaos, preventing social transformation

Ted Trainer, lecturer in the School of Social Work, University of New South Wales, March 2000, Democracy and Nature, Vol. 6, No. 1, “Where are we, where do we want to be, how do we get there?” http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol6/trainer\_where.htm

If there is a boom we in the Eco-village Movement should welcome it, through gritted teeth, because it will give us the time we desperately need. The last thing we want is a collapse of the system in the immediate future. We are far from ready. Hardly any of the hundreds of millions of people who live in rich world cities have any idea of an alternative to the consumer way and their settlements have no provision for anything but maximising the throughput of resources. By all means let’s have a collapse a little later, but the prospects for The Simpler Way depend greatly on how extensively the concept can be established before the mainstream runs into serious trouble. We need at least two more decades to build the understanding, and the most effective way to do that is by developing examples.

Alt fails in more capitalism—that furthers neoliberalism

Legrain 2K (Phillipe Legrain, special adviser to the WTO director general Mike Moore, 2000, The WTO: Boon or Bane for the Developing World, p. http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2000/The%20WTOThe%20WTO-Boon%20or%20Bane%20for%20the%20Developing%20World.htm)

A convincing case for the WTO’s abolition must show two things. First, that the world would be better off without the WTO. Second, that the WTO's abolition is preferable to any politically feasible reform. You fail to show either. Abolishing the WTO would not destroy globalisation, capitalism, or US corporate power. But it would wipe out a forum for governments to negotiate multilateral trade rules and a mechanism for holding them to those rules. That would make every country worse off, but the biggest losers would be the poor and the weak. One benefit of rules is that they apply to big, rich countries as well as small, poor ones. When America blocked imports of Costa Rican underwear, Costa Rica appealed to the WTO. It won, and America lifted its restrictions. Do you honestly think Costa Rica would have such clout in Washington without the WTO? Granted, the dispute-settlement mechanism is not perfect: America has a battery of lawyers to fight its corner, whereas small countries scrimp. It should be improved. But it is already much better than the alternative: the law of the jungle, where might makes right. Another merit of WTO rules is that they tie governments’ hands. Once countries open their markets to foreign trade and investment, they cannot close them again at whim. Without this stability, companies would be reluctant to invest abroad, particularly in developing countries with a protectionist or politically unstable record. Abolishing the WTO would further marginalise developing countries. If there were no prospect of further multilateral liberalisation and no body to enforce existing rules, trade barriers would creep up as protectionists gain the upper hand. The world might split into hostile regional blocks, with rich-country exporters seeking captive markets in developing countries. Developing countries, which need access to rich-country markets more than rich countries need access to theirs, would have to join on unfavourable terms or be left out in the cold. In any case, there would be less trade. And less trade means slower economic growth, stagnating living standards and more people trapped in poverty – like in the Great Depression. Over the past 50 years, the 15-fold rise in world trade has driven a seven-fold rise in world output. Thanks to trade, Japan and South Korea are no longer developing countries. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found that developing countries with open economies grew by 4.5 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed economies grew by 0.7 per cent a year. At that rate, open economies double in size every 16 years, while closed ones must wait a hundred. Of course, in the short term, some people lose from trade liberalisation. But in the long run, everyone gains: even the poorest South Koreans today are much richer than their counterparts 30 years ago.

Vague alts – causes shifting prevents attack – no education – voter – turns K

Galles 9 (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, <http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary_galles/>)

 The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one–including those proposing a “reform”–can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician’s product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face “customers”–voters– far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians’ “sales pitches” for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his “solution” to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)–a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan’s details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying “that was not in our proposal” or “we have no plans to do that” or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don’t spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans’ welfare is the criterion.

Alt cedes politics—perm do both—this is the net benefit to the perm and a DA to the CP

Walt 11 (Stephen M, Professor at the University of Chicago, October 19, “Lessons for the social sciences” , [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons\_for\_the\_social\_sciences](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons_for_the_social_sciences" \t "_blank))

Needless to say, I like this argument because I believe it is important for the social sciences to be a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of a monoculture where one approach or method reigns supreme. Even if one approach or theoretical model were demonstrably superior -- and that is rarely, if ever, the case -- there would still be considerable value in having lots of other scholars working in different ways. Sometimes we learn by exploring deductions in a formal model (though we often just restate the obvious when we do); at other times we learn by "soaking and poking" among policymakers, by constructing a data set and exploring patterns within it, or by immersing ourselves in the details of historical cases or by exploring the categories of thought and discourse that surround a given policy domain. Given that all these approaches yield useful knowledge, why would any serious department want to privilege one approach over all others? But because academic disciplines are largely self-defining and self-policing (i.e., we determine the "criteria of merit" and success depends almost entirely on one's reputation among fellow academics), there is the ever-present danger that academic disciplines spin off into solipsistic and self-regarding theorizing that is divorced from the real world (and therefore unlikely to be refuted by events) and of little value to our students, to policymakers, or even interested citizens. This tendency occurs primarily because proponents of one approach naturally tend to think that their way of doing business is superior, and some of them work overtime to promote people who look like them and to exclude people whose work is different. Anybody who has spent a few years in a contemporary political science department cannot fail to have observed this phenomenon at work; there just aren't very many people who are genuinely catholic in their tastes and willing to embrace work that isn't pretty much like their own. This situation creates a real dilemma: if you believe in academic freedom (and I do), then you don't want outside authorities interfering in the production of knowledge, telling academics how to do their work, or setting stupid criteria for evaluating scholarly contributions. But without some pressure to be at least potentially relevant, the social sciences are prone to drift off into what Hans Morgenthau once decried as "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical -- in short, the politically irrelevant." I've already touted my own prescriptions for this problem here, but I don't have enormous confidence that any of them will be heeded. But at the risk of seeming to tout my own employer (and similar programs elsewhere), that's why I increasingly expect the most interesting and relevant work to emerge from schools of public policy, and not from the increasingly arcane worlds of traditional disciplinary departments.

Neoliberalism solves inequality and poverty in Latin America

Haslam 12 – School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa (Paul Alexander Haslam, “Globalization in Latin America and Its Critics” International Studies Association, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 19 2012, Wiley Online Library)

After 30 years of liberal economic reforms and deeper integration into the world economy, is Latin America better-off? Many observers point to the poverty, exclusion, inequality, and disempowerment that continue to characterize the region. But the most recent figures suggest that the last decade has seen significant improvements in both poverty and inequality. In 1990, the percentage of indigent and non-indigent poor in Latin America stood at 48.3% of the population—some 200 million people. Twelve years later in 2002, the poor had declined to 44%, but due to population growth, the number of poor had increased to 221 million people. By 2009, the last year for which figures are available, the indigent and non-indigent poor had declined to 32.1% of the population, or 183 million people. These recent numbers are significantly lower, in percentage terms, than pre-crisis Latin America, circa 1980. Even the global financial crisis of 2008 only added 3 million more people to the ranks of the poor (Economic Commission for Latin America, the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010:11). Inequality has also declined over the 2002–2009 period, with the Gini coefficient falling slightly and the income gap narrowing in the vast majority of countries (ibid.:15). The story of the last decade, therefore, has been relatively effective poverty and inequality reduction in Latin America—at the same time that the region has deepened its integration with the world economy. The reasons for this turnaround, and the sustainability of the changes, are important subjects of debate. Something has changed in the region. Some cite the rise of the new left, macro-economic stability, and the commodity boom that has swelled government coffers. Others claim that politics has also become more authentically representative, social programs are being better targeted on the poor, and the education gap has diminished.

The neoliberal system's sustainable

Worstall ‘12

Tim, Senior Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, and one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. His book, Chasing Rainbows, on the economics of climate change, is available at Amazon, “Infinite growth on a finite planet? Easy-peasy!,” http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstall/100017248/infinite-growth-on-a-finite-planet-easy-peasy/]

So, using GDP, can we have infinite economic growth on a finite planet by just making ever more things? No, clearly, we cannot: there is a limit to the number of atoms available to us. But that's not actually what we're measuring in GDP: we're not measuring the amount, tonnage (it was the Soviets who measured that), volume or even number of things that are made. We are measuring the value. So, is there a limit to the amount of value that we can add? A useful way of thinking about technological advance is that it offers us either better ways of doing old things or the opportunity to do entirely new things. Either of which can also be described as the ability to add more value. Which leads us to the conclusion that as long as technology keeps advancing then we can continue to add more value and thus we can continue to have more economic growth. Strange as it may seem, this explanation built purely on standard neoclassical economics is exactly the same as the diagnosis that Herman Daly gives us in ecological economics. He tells us that we face real and imminent resource constraints (I don't agree, but let's go with his argumenent) and that thus we can have no more quantitative growth. This "quantitative" is the same as the above "more stuff". Daly also talks about qualitative growth. The "qualitative" is equal to the "add more value" and I suspect the only reason Daly doesn't say so is that he wants to be able to define what is valuable for people: you know the sort of thing, more walking in forests, more digging our own veg patches, rousing choruses of Kumbaya, as opposed to the neoclassical method of measuring value, which is what you, each and individually, value. Walks in the woods are just fine but so are steaks, excessive booze and even Simon Cowell. Whatever floats your boat. As an example, let's have a glimspe of an extreme form of Daly's "steady-state economy". This is one where resources from the environment are taken only at the rate that that environment can support. Renewables are used only at the rate at which they can be renewed. We're not chewing up mountains to make copper: we're only recycling that copper we've already got. Is economic growth possible here? Yes, obviously it is. For while we've got limited resources to play with, it is still always open to us to find new ways to add value to them. To be silly about it, we've got 1 million tonnes of copper and that's it. We use that copper to make paperweights. Then we learn how to make copper into computer motherboards and we recycle all paperweights into computers. We value the computers more than the paperweights: we've just had GDP growth, we've just had economic growth, with no increase in the consumption of resources. Even in this steady-state economy therefore, even one in which everything is recycled, we can still have economic growth through advancing technology. This advancing technology is known as an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). What we'd like to know next is how much limiting ourselves to only this type of growth is going to limit total growth. Bob Solow once worked out that 80 per cent of the economic growth in 20th-century market economies came from TFP growth. Only 20 per cent came from more resource use: in the socialist economies there was no TFP growth, and all growth came from greater resource use. So we can indeed have quite a lot of economic growth even in the greenest of economies, can we not? How do we make sure that we get that right kind of growth, one that doesn't chew up those natural resources which are a constraint? The logical answer here is to set up a committee of people to study which resources are constrained. We can then charge people higher prices for trying to use them: this will encourage them to either use other, unconstrained, resources or to figure out ways to achieve the same goals with fewer of our limited resources. Sounds like a plan – and, amazingly, we've already got that committee and that method of charging higher prices. It's called "the market", which is really an abstraction, one we must be careful not to reify, but a useful one all the same. It's really just all humans-as-producers interacting with all humans-as-consumers. If the producers find a resource more difficult to find, then they'll be less willing to do so; prices rise and consumers use less of it.

# 1AR

## Heg

#### NSA spying scandal blows up relations—perceived as a violation of trust

CNN 10/23

(Catherine E. Shoichet is a contributor to CNN. “Mexico to summon U.S. ambassador over spying allegations.” *CNN.* <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/22/world/americas/mexico-nsa-spying/>.

10/23/13. EJW.)

(CNN) -- **Mexico's foreign minister** says he's **summon**ing **the U.S. Ambassador following fresh reports of spying.¶** "**Shared security** and responsibility between respectful neighbors **cannot be constructed by** violating the law and **violating trust**," Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said Tuesday.¶ "**Mexico is convinced that the practice of espionage committed constitute** a violation of norms, an **abuse of the trust built** between partnering countries **and** **does not honor** the historic **friendship** between our nations," he added.¶ Speaking in Geneva, Meade said he would summon U.S. Ambassador Anthony Wayne upon his return to Mexico.¶ France angry over US surveillance tactics¶ His comments come days after Germany's Der Spiegel news magazine published allegations that the U.S. National Security Agency "systematically" eavesdropped on the Mexican government and hacked the public e-mail account of former Mexican President Felipe Calderon.¶ Der Spiegel named former NSA contractor Edward Snowden as the source of its information.¶ On Sunday, Mexico's government said such **spying would be unacceptable, illegitimate and against the law.¶ Meade demanded a swift investigation**, noting that U.S. President Barack Obama had vowed to investigate when earlier allegations of spying surfaced in September.¶ "Mexico finally reiterates its confidence in the conviction of President Obama that international law is not an empty promise," Meade said. "We are sure that the promise of an investigation made with Mexico is not either."¶ Mexico will also conduct its own investigation, Interior Minister Miguel Angel Osorio Chong told reporters.¶ The new allegations drew a sharp response from Calderon in a series of Twitter posts on Monday.¶ "More than personal, it is an assault on the institutions of the country, given that it was done when I was the president," Calderon said. "I will be following the steps the Foreign Ministry takes to demand explanations from the United States and the corresponding account of responsibility."¶

## d-f

**You miss-cut royal –this is his conclusion – vote neg**

Royal ‘10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer)

CONCLUSION The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that when considering the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises, ECST logic is dubious as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conﬂict indicate that global interdependence is not necessarily a conﬂict suppressing process and may be conﬂict-enhancing at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals, even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Recent US policy towards China, such as the ‘responsible stakeholder’ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conﬂict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.‘ Ofﬁ<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copeland’s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also substantial research to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also positively correlated with a rise in the likelihood of conﬂict. Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.